Journal of Organic & Inorganic Chemistry

Description

In order to improve Ti recovery, we proposed a novel pyro-hydro method for dealing with VTM concentrates in this study. First, carbon was used to partially reduce VTM concentrates at a lower temperature and with a lower carbon dosage to destroy the original structure. The next step was to remove Fe from the partially reduced VTM by leaching it through a mild H₂SO₄ acid medium to enrich TiO₂ in the leaching residue. Then, a goethite or hematite precipitation process can turn the iron in the leachate into iron oxide hydrate. V's performance during the leaching will serve as the basis for the design of its reclaiming. The performance of partial reduction and leaching was specifically examined due to the fact that the entire route includes a few steps. Optimized conditions were used for partial reduction and leaching. This paper also discusses the reduction reaction and the reduction route.

Carbon Emission

The empirical evidence demonstrates that the market-oriented trading mechanism is a crucial tool for the Chinese government's pollution control efforts. Additionally, it has a significant impact on the level of carbon technology employed by businesses and investment in low-carbon energy sources. This study employs a difference-in-difference model to investigate the impact of carbon emission trading policies on carbon emission reduction. It is based on a quasi-natural experiment of China's carbon emission trading pilots. Additionally, it investigates the mediating effects of total energy consumption, the level of technical research, and the structure of energy consumption. The findings demonstrate that a carbon emission trading policy, economic development, technical research level, and international access can significantly lessen the intensity of carbon dioxide emissions and encourage their reduction. The forest coverage rate, on the other hand, has no significant impact on carbon emission reduction, while the industrial structure and environmental protection planning hinder the process. Additionally, local governments have not actively conducted technical research while implementing the carbon emission trading policy. Instead, they have remained focused on optimizing the energy structure and reducing total energy consumption.

Energy Structure

Taking into account random fluctuations of on-grid electricity volume and carbon price, we investigate and compare the incentive effects of carbon emission rights price (carbon price) floor and revenue floor support schemes on carbon emission reduction investment at coal-fired power plants. First, we present real option models of investment in lowering carbon emissions in the context of the carbon price floor and revenue floor schemes. Governments have enacted a number of policies to control carbon emissions as environmental pollution rises. One of them is a policy with carbon quotas. By examining how the policy affected members of the supply chain, the purpose of this study was to confirm the policy's efficacy. This study examines two stages of emissions reduction in a supply chain under various carbon emission quotas. A supply chain model is built in three ways in this paper: i) There is no carbon emission quota policy; ii) The government implements the first stage of a carbon quota policy; and iii) In the second stage, the government offers lower carbon quotas. The analysis reveals that the emission reduction rate in the first stage of the carbon quota policy is higher than that without the policy when the initial carbon quota is met by the government; The fact that the government reduces carbon quotas in the second stage further accelerates the reduction rate is an intriguing finding. Customers' preference for low-carbon products increases the manufacturer's and retailer's profits in addition to the reduction rate. Both the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits go down as the decline parameter of free allocated carbon emission rights goes up. However, the manufacturer's profit in the second stage is always lower than the retailer's profit in the first stage, while the retailer's profit is higher in the second stage than in the first stage.